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Abstrakt 
V následující práci se pokusím ukázat na některé  klíčové aspekty obranné spolupráce zemí 
střední Evropy. Neorealistické paradigma bude nástroj, pomocí kterého budu zkoumat současné okolnosti 
a potenciál pro další sbližování a spolupráci zemí v tomto regionu. Mým cílem je zjistit, zda skutečnost 
odpovídá  předpokládanému neorealistickému paradigmatu v malých státech střední Evropy.  
 
Rozhodla jsem se zaměřit svou disertační práci na bezpečnost malých státu, neboť to je  velmi 
specifické téma. Domnívám se, že je důležité udělat průzkum těchto malých středoevropských států, 
neboť malé státy hrají zásadní roli při udržení stability většího celku. Spolupráce je způsob, jakým  malé 
státy o sobě dávají slyšet, ale i způsob utváření  jejich politiky. Touto spoluprací by mohly malé státy 
zvýšit svoji relativní sílu v rámci systému. Rozpočtové škrty v posledních letech snižují zdroje  na 
vojenské operace a proto země jako je Česká republika, Maďarsko a Slovensko, které již fungují v rámci 
omezených zdrojů,  musí čelit dalším škrtům. 
 
Přestože existuje mnoho faktorů, které podporují vytváření společných vojenských struktur, malé 
státy ve střední Evropě i nadále udržují svoji vlastní vojenskou sílu.  Nezávislost státu je spojena s jeho 
nezávislým vojskem. Neorealismus jako teorie  předpokládá, že státy nebudou spolupracovat na obranně 
bezpečnostních otázkách. Realitou však je, že určitá míra spolupráce již existuje. V této práci bych chtěla 
ukázat, jaká jsou omezení ve spolupráci těchto zemí, dalším cílem této práce je prozkoumat, jak 
v současné době vypadá spolupráce v oblasti obrany a zda i zde existují určitá omezení. Přestože jsou 
současné malé státy v tomto regionu ochotny vzdat se určité míry suverenity, očekávám, že najdu jasně 
vymezené hranice, ve kterých jsou nebo nejsou ochotny tyto státy spolupracovat.    
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Abstract 
In the following dissertation I seek to highlight some of the key aspects to defence cooperation in 
the region of Central Europe. The neorealist paradigm will be the guiding foundation through which I will 
explore the present circumstances and the potential for further alignment on cooperation. I aim to explore 
whether aspects of reality correspond to the expectations of neorealist paradigm in the small states of 
Central Europe.  
I have chosen to focus my dissertation on small state security because of its unique nature. 
Cooperation is a way for small states to be heard, and a way for them to shape policy. By working 
together, small states could increase the relative power they have within the system. They would also be 
able to avoid some of the expensive and potentially ineffective overlapping of military resources which 
exist in the European context. Budget cuts in the last few years have reduced the resources allocation of 
most military operations and therefore countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, 
already operating under limited resources, are faced with even more restrictions.  
Despite factors which encourage the creation of joint-military structures, the small states of 
Central Europe continue to maintain their own military presence. The sovereignty of the state is tied in 
with an independent military. Neorealism expects that states will not cooperate on defence and security 
issues. The reality is that some degree of cooperation does exist. Through this dissertation I aim to 
explore the limits to cooperation on such matters. I aim to explore what types of cooperation currently 
exist and where the boundaries are for matters of defence cooperation. While states in the present context 
are willing to sacrifice certain aspects of their sovereignty, I expect to find clear limits on where states are 
willing and not willing to cooperate.  
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1. Introduction 
In the following dissertation I seek to highlight some of the key aspects to defence 
cooperation in the region of Central Europe. The neorealist paradigm will be the guiding 
foundation through which I will explore the present circumstances and the potential for further 
alignment on cooperation. I aim to explore whether aspects of reality correspond to the 
expectations of neorealist paradigm in the small states of Central Europe.  
I have chosen to focus my dissertation on small state security because of its unique 
nature. A great deal of literature exists on the relations of large power states within the 
framework of neorealism. Less research has been done on the unique situation of small state 
security within neorealism. It is important to explore the small Central European states because 
small states play a vital role in the stability of the overall larger system. Within the European 
context, many small states are integrated into the system. Small states pursed integration into the 
established structures of the European Union and NATO in an effort to find stability in the 
system. As such, integration for these states was seen as beneficial to their national interests.  
Cooperation is therefore a way for small states to be heard, and a way for them to shape 
policy. By working together, small states could increase the relative power they have within the 
system. They would also be able to avoid some of the expensive and potentially ineffective 
overlapping of military resources which exist in the European context. Budget cuts in the last 
few years have reduced the resources allocation of most military operations and therefore 
countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, already operating under limited 
resources, are faced with even more restrictions.  
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Despite factors which encourage the creation of joint-military structures, the small states 
of Central Europe continue to maintain their own military presence. The sovereignty of the state 
is tied in with an independent military. Neorealism expects that states will not cooperate on 
defence and security issues. The reality is that some degree of cooperation does exist. Through 
this dissertation I aim to explore the limits to cooperation on such matters. I aim to explore what 
types of cooperation currently exist and where the boundaries are for matters of defence 
cooperation. While states in the present context are willing to sacrifice certain aspects of their 
sovereignty, I expect to find clear limits on where states are willing and not willing to cooperate.  
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2. Explaining Theory 
2.1.   Introduction to Realism 
Prominent theories have been looked to in an attempt to find trends in the past, to explain 
the progression of present dynamics and even sometimes, to speculate the likelihood of future 
events. A number of well laid out and thoroughly composed theories have been at the centrefold 
over the last few decades. Some of these theories derive from a similar origin and have been 
elaborated on in an attempt to clarify shortcomings, while others have resulted from the distain 
of present models and have moved in an opposite, albeit recognizable direction. In the role of 
small state defence and military security, the school of thought surrounding realist paradigm has 
continued to exert its influence. ―Traditionally, the conceptualization of security was generally 
taken – explicitly or implicitly—from the classical Realism paradigm‖1. Since its inception, 
realism has proved to be a valuable tool. It has been used as a conceptual framework through 
which reality is analyzed. Realism considers the nature of the international system as an 
important factor for state decision-making and the basic goals and patterns which regulate state 
behaviour.   
Hans Morgenthau was the first to introduce the term realism as a theory in international 
relations and outlined the basic core principles of the theory. According to him, the primary 
characteristic of state behaviour was a result of the never-ending struggle for power between 
states. This power struggle was due to the ―animus dominandi”, or the nature of humans to seek 
                                                          
1
 Hakan Wiberg. ‗Security Problems of Small Nations‖, in Small States and the Security Challenges in the New 
Europe, ed. by Werner Bauwens, Armand Clesse and Olav F. Knudsen, London and Washington: Brassey‘s Atlantic 
Commentaries, 1996, pp. 20-41, (p. 22). 
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out domination over others
2
. Later scholars were dissatisfied with the explanation Morgenthau 
gave for the nature of the international system and as a result, many new variations of neorealism 
emerged. After this, realism became known as classical realism.
3
  
2.2.  Introduction to Neorealism 
Two of the most prominent participants in the new neorealist dialogue are John 
Mearsheimer, who postulated his improvements through the subsequent theory of offensive 
realism
4
, and Kenneth Waltz, whose theory is best known as defensive neorealism
5
. ―These two 
versions of neo-realism, offensive and defensive Realism, are more policy relevant…and, thus, 
may be seen as more prescriptive than the other versions‖6. 
Realism, and subsequently neorealism, is the fundamental paradigm for defence dialogue. 
Neorealism explores the anarchic nature of the international system and the role states play 
within such a system. Originating from the same source, offensive and defensive realism share 
many similarities. Some academics even argue that the two theories could be used in conjunction 
                                                          
2
 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 
1948, (chapter 1). 
3
 For further explanation of classical realist paradigm please see Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The 
Struggle for Power and Peace, Fifth Edition, New York,Alfred A. Knopf, 1978; E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years‘ 
Crisis: 1919-1939, London, Macmillan, 1946;Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in 
Ethics and Politics, New York, Scribners, 1932; and Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on 
International Politics, Baltimore, MD., Johns Hopkins, 1962. Classical realism was touched upon briefly in this 
analysis because it is an important source from which more modern neorealist theories have derived. A thorough 
description is therefore outside the realm of this dissertation.  
4
 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York, W.W. Norton, 2001 (hereafter, 
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy). Other examples of offensive neorealism include Eric J. Labs, ‗Beyond Victory: 
Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims‘, Security Studies, 6, 1977, 4, pp. 1-49; Robert Gilpin, War and 
Change in World Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981; and Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to 
Power: The Unusual Origins of America‘s World Role, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1998.  
5
 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley, 1979 (hereafter, Waltz, 
Theory). Other examples of defensive neorealism are Robert Jervis, ‗Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma‘, 
World Politics, 30, 1978, 2, pp. 167-214; Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International 
Ambition, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1991; Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: The Structure of Power 
and the Roots of War, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1999; and Stephan M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 
Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1991. 
6
 (Baylis and Smith 2006: 210). 
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to describe a broader range of state behaviour. Glenn Snyder in his 2002 publication stated that 
Mearsheimer‘s offensive neorealism, ―nicely compliments [defensive neorealism] by introducing 
a theoretical rationale for revisionist states [which] provides a foundation for merging offensive 
and defensive realism into a single theory‘7. The theories of offensive and defensive realism are 
two of the most marked works in their field. A degree of rivalry exists between the two 
paradigms but both are successful at illustrating key components of the conceptual framework 
through which to explore state defence and security
8
. 
2.3.  Key Theoretical Concepts  
One of the key components of neorealist theory is state struggle for relative power. 
―Offensive realists… believe that status quo powers are rarely found in world politics, because 
the international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to fain 
power at the expense of rivals, and to take advantage of those situations when the benefits 
outweigh the costs‖9. State survival is of foremost concern in offensive neorealism because 
competition is paramount. In an effort to survive, states seek to increase their own security.  
When the desire to maximize the security of each state takes centre stage, the clear result 
is a conflict in interest between states. The concept of a security dilemma is used to describe this 
situation. According to John Herz in a security dilemma states, ―striving to attain security from… 
attack, [they] are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the 
                                                          
7
 Glenn H. Snyder, ‗Mearsheimer‘s World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A Review Essay‘ 
(hereafter, ‗Mearsheimer‘s‘), International Security, 27, 2002,1, pp. 149-173,  (p. 151).  
8
 For the purposes of this analysis I will focus primarily on offensive neorealism, while using certain aspects of 
defensive neorealism as a comparative focus. Mearsheimer‘s offensive neorealism is one of the most modern takes 
on the theory in relation to security and defence. Offensive neorealism is also the best overall paradigm for many of 
the aspects of small state Central European defence and security addressed in this analysis. I make a point to 
highlight key differences between the two theories when these existing differences are relevant for the purposes of 
this analysis. 
9
 Snyder, ‗Mearsheimer‘s‘, p. 152.  
Page | 14  
 
power of others. This, in turn, renders the other more insecure and compels them to prepare for 
the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of betting units, power 
competition ensues and the vicious circle of security and power accumulations is on‖10. Through 
their efforts, states potentially threaten the security of others. In accordance with Mearsheimer‘s 
offensive neorealist theory, states can never be sure of the intentions of other states and therefore 
there is distrust in the system.  
Another key feature of the neorealist paradigm is the concept of anarchy. According to 
neorealism, states exist in a perpetual state of anarchy. Anarchy in this sense does not need to 
mean chaos and war, but rather, a general lack of a supranational body to enforce rules or norms 
and governs the relations between states. The most fundamental issue which is a result of 
anarchy is state survival. The lack of trust in conjunction with the state of anarchy motivates 
states to assume each other‘s behaviour to be threatening. ―States are disposed to think 
offensively towards other states even though their ultimate motive is simply to survive‖11.  
According to Mearsheimer, the need to increase state power is boundless, and there is no point, 
short of global hegemony, where states feel sufficiently secure.   
By comparison, Waltz believes that the main goal of states in the international system is 
to maintain sufficient security for survival. According to defensive neorealism, security can 
therefore be achieved without total global hegemony. ―In anarchy, security is the highest end. 
Only if survival is assured can states safely seek such other goals as tranquillity, profit and 
power. The first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their positions in the 
                                                          
10
 John H. Herz, ‗Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma‘, World Politics, 2, 1959, 2, pp. 157-180,  
(p.163).  
11
 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy, p. 34.  
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system‖12. Therefore, according to Waltz, the central mechanism for order is the balance of the 
power relationships. 
An increase in security is understood to be an increase in relative power. The more power 
a state has, the more secure its position in the international system. In the neorealist paradigm, 
power is equated with an accumulation of military resources in conjunction with the capability to 
use these resources to the advancement of national interest. Despite the nature of the anarchic 
system, some degree of cooperation does exist in the international system, even on defence and 
security matters. According to offensive neorealism, states place a much higher value on security 
than in defensive neorealism. The amount of necessary or appropriate security which is essential 
for survival comes into question. Mearsheimer makes an excellent point in his theory when he 
explains the difficulty in assessing the right level of ―appropriateness‖. This difficulty stems 
from the changing nature of international relations and states diplomacy. What is necessary for 
achieving security today might change with the events of tomorrow. This dilemma can include 
actual defence relations between states, or can take national interests and ambitions into 
consideration as well. The protective measures states are motivated to take in order to guard for 
their own interests are seen as threatening to others, thereby creating a disincentive for 
cooperation.   
In contrast defensive realism allows for cooperation because any zealous amassing of 
power, according to Waltz, will be self-defeating. Such an insatiable drive will only lead to other 
states acting through balancing behaviour
13
. Therefore, when it is beneficial to state security to 
cooperate, states have the potential for cooperation. States in offensive realism have 
                                                          
12
 Waltz, Theory, p. 126. 
13
 Kenneth N. Waltz, ‗The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory‘, in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., 
The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1989, (p. 49).  
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expansionary intentions but do not always act in an offensive manner. According this paradigm, 
states will only look to expand when the costs clearly outweigh the benefits of such behaviour. 
Therefore limiting factors might change states behaviour but it does not change their ambitions
14
. 
There are a number of structural constraints which have emerged in the European context 
since the end of the Cold War. Structural constraints in a system limit or constrain the behaviour 
of states within that system. The two principal organizations which have emerged as structural 
constraints on states are the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Trade Organization 
(NATO). ―Waltzian neorealism is primarily a theory about how defensively oriented states 
behave in response to structural constraints‖15. The primary example of a substantial example on 
defence matters is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Such structural constraints 
are not necessary supranational organizations but both have the capacity to act as structural 
constraints.    
2.4.  Potential for Action  
In accordance with neorealism, an organization such as NATO can be an effort on the 
part of states to create a new balance of power. After the end of the Cold War, the traditional 
balance of power scenario between the two super-powers of the Soviet Union and the United 
States was upset. Neorealists would argue that despite these efforts to building institutions for 
cooperation within the changing environment of the international system their, ―effectiveness 
depends on the support of major powers‖16. 
                                                          
14
 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy, p. 37.  
15
 Snyder, ‗Mearsheimer‘s‘, p. 158.  
16
 John Baylis, Steven Smith and Patricia Owens. The Globalization of World Politics, Third Edition, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2006. (hereafter, Baylis and Smith, The Globalization), p. 209.  
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When it comes to defence cooperation, even within an institutional framework such as 
NATO, two important concepts emerge. In defence, states have the choice between balancing 
and buck-passing against a potential threat. In terms of military conflict explained through 
neorealist theory, balancing against a revisionist state means taking action to maintain the present 
balance of power in the system. ―The concept of balance-of-threat, according to which balancing 
happens not against ‗power‘, but against ‗threats‘ – which are a mix of power, military 
capabilities, political intentions and geographic proximity‖17.  
Such behaviour can include banding together with other threatened states, forming 
alliances or partnerships to increase relative power and working together to deter aggressive 
behaviour from another state. Buck-passing, on the other hand, is the decision of a state to take 
no action. A state which chooses to buck-pass the responsibility of resistance hopes that another 
state will successfully take up the ―buck‖. Such a move is both risky and potentially beneficial at 
the same time. If another state is willing and capable of effective resistance to a revisionist state, 
then the buck-passer benefits in their choice of inaction. Adversely, if the other state fails in its 
resistance to the revisionist state, then the buck-passer faces a difficult situation of then having to 
take up the ―buck‖ and doing so potentially with no allies remaining. According to Snyder, 
―what presumably is the central trade-off in choosing between balancing and buck-passing [is 
the] maximization of deterrence at the cost of certain involvement if deterrence fails (balancing) 
versus less effective deterrence plus a greater chance of staying out of war if it occurs (buck-
passing)‖18.  
                                                          
17
 Sten Rynning, ‗Realism and the Common Security and Defence Policy*‘, Journal of Common Market Studies, 49, 
2011, 1, pp. 23-42, (p. 26).  
18
 Snyder, ‗Mearsheimer‘s‘, p 162.  
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The structure of the system, determined primarily by anarchy working in conjunction 
with the abovementioned features, is the primary cause of state behaviour according to 
neorealism. The distribution of power between states and the distribution of their capabilities 
determines the influence that they have in the system. For this reason, it is the state‘s power in 
the system which shapes its behaviour. While military might is important for neorealists, 
according to Baylis and Smith, ―power is more than the accumulation of military resources and 
the ability to use this power to coerce and control other states in the system… neorealists see 
power as the combination capabilities of a state. States are differentiated in the system by their 
power and not by their function‖19. Therefore the focus is on power and on capabilities. The 
distribution of power in a system is crucial to understanding the behaviour of each entity within 
that system.  
A determinant for cooperation in security matters is therefore the structure of the system. 
According to the Mearsheimer, there are three types of system structures: bipolar, balanced 
multipolar and unbalanced multipolar. A bipolar system is one in which there are two great 
powers who balance against each other. Such a system, Mearsheimer says, is the most stable 
form. In a bipolar system buck-passing does not occur because there is no one else capable of 
catching the buck
20
. In a multipolar system there are more than two great powers which are 
comparable in size, power and influence. Neorealists argue that such a system is less stable than 
a bipolar system because the more powerful players there are in a system the more chance for 
changing alliances. A balanced multipolar system contains multiple powerful states all vying for 
their position of authority.  ―Buck-passing is most attractive in a balanced multipolar system 
because, with roughly equal capabilities, each great power individually can hold off an 
                                                          
19
 Baylis and Smith, The Globalization , p. 209.  
20
 Snyder, ‗Mearsheimer‘s‘, p. 161.  
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aggressor, and is therefore capable of ‗accepting‘ the buck‖21. An unbalanced multipolar system 
is one in which one state is larger than the rest within the system. The larger state in an 
unbalanced multipolar system has a clear disproportionate hold on power and therefore is viewed 
as a potential hegemon. In an unbalanced multipolar system there is only one state that is 
powerful enough to accept the buck, while the other states are not powerful enough to take up the 
responsibility. According to Snyder, the clear preference in such a system is balancing against 
the larger and stronger state
22
. 
One factor which inhibits the system from falling in to a state of perpetual and continuous 
war, according to defensive neorealists, is that states realize in most cases the costs of war 
outweighs the benefits
23
. Expansionist behaviour is seen by most as irrational behaviour and one 
which goes against established norms.  The logic of defensive neorealists maintains that where 
states might cooperate, under the correct conditions, they are not likely to blindly trust. 
―Although they recognize that areas of common or mutual interests exist, defensive neorealists 
are concerned about non-compliance or cheating by states, especially in security policy areas‖24. 
The need to protect oneself in case of the breakdown of cooperation is evident.  
The emphasis on power stipulates that states focus on helping themselves over the 
common interest of all and over cooperation. The preference for self help behaviour stems from 
the state‘s own orientation towards self-interest maximization. According to neorealism, a state 
with enough power ―would most likely pursue a unilateral strategy of increasing military 
                                                          
21
 Snyder, ‗Mearsheimer‘s‘, p. 161. 
22
 Snyder, ‗Mearsheimer‘s‘, p. 161. 
23
 Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University 
Press, 1991and Robert Jervis, ‗Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate‘, International 
Security, 24, 1999, 1, pp. 42-63. 
24
 Baylis and Smith, The Globalization , p. 211. 
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strength to protect and secure its interests‖25. These decisions to act are, according to the 
paradigm, rational decision as a result of states being rational actors. Following this logic 
therefore, the decisions states make will follow their national interests and, most likely, expected 
norms.  
The presence, and the fear, of states cheating in a system is another an important 
indicator of the willingness of states to cooperate. Cooperation is therefore determined in part, by 
how states view the cooperative efforts of other states involved. Neorealism stipulates that states 
will be discouraged from cooperation if they perceive other states have a larger relative gain 
from the arrangement of the cooperation or are not following the rules stipulated in the 
cooperation. ―The fundamental question… [of] neorealism is not whether all parties gain from 
the cooperation; but, who will gain more if we cooperate‖26. 
 Defensive neorealists make an important differentiation between cooperation with states 
which are friends and states which are revisionist. The theory suggests that states would more 
readily cooperate with friends over expansionary states. The inconsistency of such relationships 
is that states which could potentially be friends today might have been enemies a few decades 
ago, or might yet become enemies in the future. Therefore the friendly relations within an 
organization such as NATO or the European Union still fall within the framework of anarchy 
and are therefore influenced by concerns over trust. According to offensive realists, such as 
Mearsheimer, ―incompatibility of states‘ goals and interests enhances the competitive nature of 
an anarchic system and makes conflict as inevitable as cooperation‖27. The persistent potential 
                                                          
25
 Baylis and Smith, The Globalization , p. 209.  
26
 Baylis and Smith, The Globalization , p. 210. 
27
 Baylis and Smith, The Globalization , p. 211. 
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for conflict stipulates that sovereign military capacity to protect national interest is constantly 
needed.  
States will always desire to expand power and if they have enough relative power to do 
so. The pursuit of national interest therefore, is bound to elicit conflict with other states. 
Expansionist states threaten the balance of power of the international system and create a 
security dilemma within the system; states must always be ready to respond to such a threat. 
―Thus, talk of reducing military budgets at the end of the cold war was considered by offensive 
neo-realists to be pure folly‖28. 
2.4. Small State Theory 
A great deal of analysis has gone in to the defence and security concerns of great power 
states. In comparison, far fewer studies have looked at the unique situation of small state security 
and the particular challenges these states face. As a result of great power states‘ influence in the 
system, the existing literature on neorealism often explores the function of such states. In many 
ways small states are similar to large states In fact, Olav Knudsen mentions that leaders of small 
states participate in the same decision-making process as their larger counterparts. He also points 
out that small states have similar behavioural matters regarding national interests
29
. In the 
neorealist paradigm the security interest of all states is survival, achieved by diminishing the 
likelihood of internal or external attack. According to realism for a state to function it must claim 
sovereignty and exercise its will to fulfil its needs.  
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The difference between what constitutes a small state lies in the disparity between 
defence capability and survival. A state‘s defence capabilities need to be viewed in a relative 
rather than absolute manner. The relative power position of small states denotes their unique 
position as small states. The concern over survival which small states face delegates unique 
issues to be examined. According to Knudsen, the condition of being small rests on political 
context. That is to say, ―that smallness is interesting for a security perspective only under certain 
circumstances, when being relatively small takes on a predominant significance for the solution 
of a decisional problem‖30. Political context, according to the author, has its basis on 
―situational‖ and ―given‖ characteristics. Situational characteristics can include the national 
interests at a given period, and the given characteristics can include continuing factors such as 
physical location and size
31
.  
The condition of smallness is therefore a subjective one. What constitutes a small state 
can vary depending on how the term is quantified. When comparing Slovakia to Poland, it is 
Slovakia which is relatively small, but when comparing Poland to the United States, it can be 
concluded that Poland is relatively small. ―The proper analytical focus of small-state security 
problem is not the unit of the small state itself. Rather it is the problems which characteristically 
occur more often in the experience of small states‖32. According to the author it is not the size of 
the state but rather the experience of power disparity which makes small states unique.  
From the theoretical paradigm, one can stipulate that the actual size of a state is less 
important than its relative size. In order to undertake such a task it is necessary to first look at 
which factors affect the security of small states. To explore these factors, it is necessary to 
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explore the fundamental assumptions of the theoretic framework employed in such situations. 
Bandwagoning is a term used in neorealist paradigm in international relations. The term is 
promoted by Kenneth Waltz and refers to the behaviour of small states to join coalitions with 
larger and more powerful states in the balance of power politics. ―Small states tend to 
bandwagon with growing or threatening powers in an attempt to preserve themselves‖33. The 
term is in contrast to the concept of balancing which assumes that weaker states would act in 
accordance to balance against an aggressive larger power. According to Waltz, bandwagoning 
occurs when weaker states decide that cooperating, rather than opposing, a large power state 
would be more beneficial to national interest.  
In the neorealist paradigm, states are not expected to participate often in bandwagoning 
and the decision to bandwagon is rarely made. States participate in bandwagoning in 
circumstances when there is no possibility of creating a balancing coalition or when a state is 
geographically enclosed. Bandwagoning rarely occurs because it is generally harmful to the 
national interests of a state by allowing a rival to gain power.  According to Waltz, ―If states 
wished to maximize power, they would join the stronger side and we would see not balances 
forming but world hegemony forged. This does not happen because balancing, not 
bandwagoning, is the behaviour induced in the system. The first concern of states is not to 
maximize power, but to maintain their position in the system‖34.  
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 According to Snyder, ―When challenger and defender are contiguous on land, balancing 
will be favoured because otherwise the challenger might easily overrun the defender
35
 . The 
geographic variables in a region with many states, and in particular a mixture of large and small 
states, are a strong motivational factor for the prevalence of balancing. Small state countries 
which share physical borders with a larger power survive under the potential for being overrun in 
a military confrontation. Such a threat overrides the desire of small states to dominate in the 
system. Therefore reason why small states engage in power balancing in the European context is 
due, in large part, to the geographical constraints of the region. 
By nature of their size, small states are not able to become hegemonic powers, but rather 
their goals reflect a more balance of power approach to security. NATO has emerged, ―as the 
most tangible element in the continent-wide institutional infrastructure underpinning decisions 
and actions to avoid and manage crises in Europe… Such a co-ordination lends actions political 
legitimacy, although it will probably be plagued with practical difficulties‖36. According to 
defensive neorealism, the desire of small states to join a security initiative such as NATO is a 
reasonable conclusion used to obtain security. By becoming members of the larger and power 
powerful regional organization, small states are able to maintain their security position in the 
international context. The benefits of cooperation and alliances can be ―a cost effective substitute 
for military expansion‖37. When security is the decisive goal, alliances can help to obtain this 
goal.  
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The concept of a hegemonic power takes precedence in offensive neorealism. States are 
fearful of another state which is more powerful within a system. According to Snyder, it is 
―virtually impossible‖ for a state to become a global hegemonic power. Such a state would not 
fear any retaliation from other states and would be capable of international destruction. A more 
likely scenario is therefore a regional hegemonic state. A hegemonic state is one which has a 
monopoly on power. ―Thus, is a region contains more than one great power, there is no 
hegemon
38
 . A hegemonic power is a concern to states because it is difficult to balance against. 
Small states with limited resources run the risk of being overrun or of being coerced by a 
regional hegemony. Such a move would reduce the sovereignty of the small state. The national 
interests of states according to neorealism are not complementary, and therefore the national 
interests of a hegemon would be detrimental to the national interests of its smaller neighbours. 
Following neorealist logic, a state which has not achieved a hegemonic position will seek to 
expand its power in the system and to limit the power of neighbouring states. According to 
Mearsheimer, what differentiates a potential hegemon is the difference between the size of its 
economy and army in comparison to other states in the region
39
.  
In the international system of balancing there are two concerns of states, entrapment and 
abandonment. ―The abandonment-entrapment dichotomy highlights the costs and risks of that 
choice for the alliance relationship itself‖40. One of the primary deterrents of security cooperation 
is the fear of entrapment. States fear being left behind (abandonment) but conversely also fear 
being dragged in to an unwanted situation (entrapment). According to Mearsheimer‘s offensive e 
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neorealism, states are more concerned with entrapment than they are with the possibility of being 
abandoned
41
.  
In neorealist paradigm, even though states might sign defence agreements, they always 
remain aware of the need to provide national security to afford survival as a last resort. Therefore 
whether states compete or cooperate is due in large part to the national interests of those states. 
Certain organizational bodies exist to facilitate cooperation but the success of such organizations 
is a result of the willingness of states to achieve similar goals. Institutions such as the European 
Union or even NATO do not shape security relations between states but rather they are 
influenced by the present relationship between those countries
42
.  
3. Describing the Region 
3.1. Setting the Scene 
In recent decades a great deal of change has taken place in the international system. In 
particular the European continent has seen a drastic shift in its security environment. The 
emergence of the newly independent and the newly democratized Central and Eastern European 
states have played a important role in these changes. ―A failure to understand the security 
perspective of the small states of the continent would leave a gap in our knowledge of the 
European setting at a time when efforts are being made to build more universal and inclusive 
political and economic structures‖43. The European countries that have experienced the most 
change in the post-Cold War years are the Central and Eastern European states.  
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The security dynamics of the international system have been in transition since the fall of 
the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. According to Bastian Giegorich, ―the structure of 
the international system seems to be in a state of fluidity‖44. In the past, the traditional notion of 
international security was more a concern over territorial integrity and was association with the 
use of military confrontation between states
45
. While this is still holds true in certain areas of the 
world, in the European context there has been an obvious change in the nature of security threats 
with the emergence of various regulatory mechanisms. The establishment of institutional bodies 
and the integration process of member states within these institutions have resulted in an 
environment drastically different from the traditional notion of international security. Some 
would argue that the very nature of a security is changing.  
The changing environment has brought with it new challenges as well as certain benefits. 
The world has in many ways changed the role that small states play as well as the dangers which 
they face. Allen Sens, in his extensive research, was able to isolate some of the most common 
security interests of small states in the post Cold War period. These areas of interest are: 
1. ―Maintenance of territorial sovereignty and claim to be acting as independent, 
sovereign entities; 
2. Establishment of security guarantees; 
3. Maintenance of the widespread adherence to non-confrontational and non-violent 
norms; 
4. Prevention of the spread of existing ethno-religious conflict; 
5. Prevention of the growth of domestic separatist or irredentist sentiments; 
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6. Maintenance of patterns of co-operation and the operation of multilateral political, 
security, and economic institutions, and inclusion in the consultative process of 
these institutions; 
7. Prevention, as much as possible, of dominance by a great power or by a concert of 
great powers‖ 46 
 
The historic atmosphere in the Central Europe of the past was one of intense interstate 
competition. Competition between states meant that military presence and hard security played a 
vital role in survival. In the twentieth century, Central European states struggled through 
territorial disputes. In an effort to gain influence, they would often try to attract the attention and 
support of major powers
47
. Hard security by definition includes military and physical defence 
aspects of states. From these categories one can see a trend towards a rise in non-hard security 
matters in the European context. With the creation and expansion of international institutional 
bodies and the phenomenon of globalization, there has been a clear shift towards an environment 
of cooperation, interdependence and integration within Europe. The shift away from the more 
traditional small state concerns are evident.  
Despite this shift in security and defence interests away from purely hard security 
matters, the presence of such concerns still exists. The move away from the imminent hard 
security threats of the Cold War does not mean that such concerns are no longer present. 
European states are still concerned about physical security and survival. Military presence 
continues to exist in European countries. According to Hakan Wiberg, ―military preparedness 
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has by no means lost in significance‖ in the post-Cold War era48. As such, small states in the 
region of Central Europe are still concerned with upholding territorial sovereignty and a military 
presence. 
In order to focus on the region, it is necessary to clearly define which states will be 
included in the analysis. There has been some contention among scholars and policy makers as to 
which countries accurately constitute Central Europe. In historical terms, Europe was generally 
broken up in to two regions; west and east. Since the end of the Cold War, different regions 
within the former Eastern bloc have emerged. These categories include Central Europe, Eastern 
Europe and South Eastern Europe.  
―During the Cold War several regions and political entities were practically non-existent 
in the dominant Western discourse and consciousness. Central Europe was no doubt one of them 
that also serves as the primary example of the revival and political use of this term to end bipolar 
division if Europe in minds as well as in deeds‖49. For the purposes of this analysis I will focus 
on Visegrad countries as Central Europe. These Visegrad countries are the, ―heartland of Central 
Europe‖50.These four countries, ―are present in all major concepts of Central Europe‖ and share 
similarities and uniqueness which sets them apart from the other former Soviet bloc countries 
51
. 
Some analysts contend that a country such as Austria fits this description as well. However, 
Austria has had a very different experience to Visegrad countries throughout the Cold War years 
and the following period of integration.  
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The countries of Visegrad share similarities unique to the region. For starters, they share 
similar historic memories, common cultural characteristics and a common physical space. The 
area of Central Europe has been characterized by its members and labelled by some historians as 
the ―forgotten‖ or abandoned West. Most historians would agree that Central Europe was often 
seen as a buffer-zone between the West and the East. ―The Central/Eastern Europe region, 
historically of mixed ethnicity, played the role of ‗borderland‘ or ‗buffer zone‘ between Germany 
and Russia‖52. The states developed a sense of isolation. Such feelings thus became a strong 
motivational factor for the Central European states and were firmly embedded in national 
consciousness. ―Each nation had experienced the terror of imperial violence, which went on 
before the eyes of the world. For Czechoslovakia this was the years of 1938 and 1968, for 
Hungary 1956, for Poland 1939‖53.  
The closer proximity of Central European countries to the West and the self-perception of 
being ―Western‖ are common characteristics to the Central European states. The desire to re-
establish ties with the West has been a motivational factor for cooperation between Central 
European states. Central European countries have been quicker to adopt a successful market 
economy and democratic government than their Eastern counterparts. In general, there is more 
active civil society, less corruption and a better functioning political system in the four Visegrad 
countries.  
Security concerns have for decades played an important role in the national interests of 
Central Europe. These countries were often times caught between competing super-powers, 
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facing potent threats to the very continuation of their existence. The Cold War era was 
characterized by military domination and the possibility of devastating nuclear confrontation. 
Without a dominating military presence of their own, the countries of Central Europe were at the 
whim of the more powerful states in the region; such as the Soviet Union and Germany.  
The end of the Cold War brought about a new power architecture in the former Eastern 
bloc. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of troops from the region created a 
power vacuum. The countries formerly within the Eastern bloc now faced a new unstable 
environment. In an effort to increase their security, these states looked to build closer ties to the 
West. Some of the immediate common goals of Central European states following 1989 included 
the desire to push Soviet troops out of the region and to discontinue and dismantle the Warsaw 
Pact. Following these objectives, the primary common goal and reason for cooperation between 
these states was the desire for integration into the Euro-Atlantic institutions.  
The European Union and its constituent states also had to re-evaluate their relationship 
with and policies towards the former communist states. The end of the deadlock between the 
West and the Soviet Union instigated potential for great change. Prior to 1989, the international 
environment provided little opportunity for mobility and transformation. The power vacuum 
created at the end of the Cold War left the former Eastern bloc countries with few options but to 
augment their power relationship with Europe. These countries, relatively small in comparison to 
the larger European nations, banded together to fulfil the new goals set forth by the West in an 
effort to gain NATO and European Union membership.  
These elements therefore point to the fact that Central Europe‘s main motivation for 
cooperation rests in common national interest goals and established cultural similarities. 
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―Intellectuals from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland (Milan Kindera, Czeslaw Milos and 
Gyorgy Konrad) who wanted not only to resuscitate the old dream of this region‘s special 
cultural identity, but also to distinguish it from the East. This attempt was driven mainly by 
distancing from the Soviet system by recovering some of the past values, ideals, aspirations, 
solutions and practices and potentially by re-Europeanising it‖54.While shared historical 
memories helped to build the region, they are not the only fundamental elements to cooperation.  
3.2. Demographics of the Region 
Three of the states, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia share considerable 
similarities. They are similar in population, GDP and in geographic size. According to the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Military Balance 2011 publication
55
, the 
population of Hungary is approximately 10 million people, Czech Republic is approximately 
10.4 million people and Slovakia is approximately 5.5 million people. By comparison, the much 
larger population of Poland accounts for nearly 38.5 million people.  The GDP of the three 
smaller Visegrad countries for 2010 are as follows: Hungary at $130 billion, the Czech Republic 
at $197 billion and Slovakia at $88.4 billion. The GDP of Poland is $470 billion, well over the 
amount of the next highest Visegrad country, the Czech Republic. The land mass of Hungary is 
approximately 93,000 square kilometres, the Czech Republic is approximately 79,000 square 
kilometres and Slovakia is the smallest at 49,000 square kilometres. These numbers pale in 
comparison to Poland that has a land mass of over 312,000 square kilometres.  As a percentage 
of GDP, all four of the Visegrad countries have comparable military expenditure. The military 
expenditure of Hungary as a percentage of GDP is 1.75 percent, the Czech Republic is 1.46 
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percent, Slovakia is 1.87 percent and Poland is 1.71 percent. Despite these similar percentages, 
the clear differences in size and GDP results in significant differences in nominal terms.  
Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia share a common historical memory stemming 
from the Hapsburg Empire. Poland on the other hand has a different political legacy. Poland has 
a mixed political heritage under three different systems; Russian, Hapsburg and Prussian. Poland 
did not have the administrative unity present in the former Hapsburg states. As a result of its 
legacy, Poland represents a different political environment. In addition, it is a much larger state 
in relative terms to the other Visegrad members. Poland‘s size and population nearly equals the 
other three states combined. Being such a large state, Poland has unique national interests and 
concerns separate from small states. The large capacity of Poland has resulted in certain 
unilateral decision, especially in issues relating to agriculture and farming. In recent years, 
Poland has even voiced its wish to become one of the major power players of the European 
environment. According to Martin Dangerfield, ―Poland will—as a result of its size, key areas of 
interest in EU policies, together with its regional and global security perspectives—gravitate to 
the larger EU states‖56. 
According to Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu, Poland‘s national agenda regarding 
Russia differs from the other smaller Central European states. The other states label Poland as 
the ―New Cold Warrior‖ because of its general antagonistic attitude towards Russia. The three 
other countries in contrast, have aspired for a more neutral position regarding Russia. According 
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to the authors, Hungary and Slovakia can be considered ―friendly pragmatists‖ and the Czech 
Republic as ―frosty pragmatist.‖57 
The defence interests of the three small states considerably differ from that of Poland. 
According to Dangerfield, Poland seeks to take an active role in shaping European Union 
policies in a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
58
. Poland has voiced its desire to 
shape policies in the European Union. With its large population and land mass, Poland hopes to 
be an active member of the large six member states of the EU. In addition, ―willingness and 
enthusiasm to engage its military outside Europe, indulge a global perspective on security issues, 
and attempt to dominate the regional security arrangements would also distinguish [Poland]‖59.  
Poland‘s military agenda sets the country apart from its Visegrad neighbours. Poland is a 
much greater contributor than the other Central European states to military operations in NATO. 
In contrast, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia engage in a pattern of behaviour within 
NATO that falls under a more auxiliary role. The smaller states of Visegrad tend to adopt a more 
―defensive posture‖ to European Union policies as well60. These countries do not share Poland‘s 
aspirations to directly influence security policy. According to Dangerfield, these small states also 
have a more ―inward-looking passive approach to foreign policy in general‖61. This distinction 
means that they are more focused on internal issues and tend to react to new politics instead of 
proposing them.  
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3.3. Central European Security Complex 
Despite some of these differences, the region of Central Europe does share some 
fundamental similarities in their national interest concerns and in security policies. These 
similarities have contributed to some degree of cooperation between states in the region. To 
continue the analysis, it is necessary to note that a security dilemma exists in the region. A 
security dilemma by its nature is a component to the success or failure of regional cooperation. 
The security dilemma of a set of states closely bound by geography is referred to as a security 
complex. The concept of a ―security complex‖ is defined by Barry Buzan as ―a group of states 
whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities 
cannot realistically be considered apart from one another‖62.  
The very nature of the European system contains overlapping security institutions as well 
as states with interlinked security interests. ―The alliance security dilemma turns on several 
variables, but essentially on the level of dependence and firmness of commitment between 
allies‖63. The security complex within Central Europe is a key concept which drives cooperation 
in the region. Therefore while some differences exist, the similarities between the national 
interests of Central European states, and in particular between the three smaller states, create a 
noteworthy security complex in the region.  
According to Vladimir Ryabtsev, a security complex can be explained as a special 
regulatory mechanism
64
. A regulatory mechanism is a component within a system which is used 
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to keep the internal environment of that system relatively stable despite changes in the external 
environment. ―This regulatory mechanism is characterized by a quality of interstate interactions 
within a specific zone of the world (thus it is important that the states belong to single 
geographic zone), when the conditions conducive to the emergence of dissension, disputes, and 
conflicts between the states are reduced to the achievable minimum. At the same time, the 
complex provides a framework within which a sophisticated, efficient, and effective system of 
procedures, instruments, and mechanisms for managing crisis and conflict situations exists‖65. 
The author contends that such a security complex is best built between states through 
cooperation in a variety of different sectors. Such cooperation would increase confidence 
between states, and therefore facilitate further cooperation. By doing so, a security complex 
reduces the likelihood of conflict in a region and helps to assure states within a certain region 
that cooperation is beneficial to everyone‘s national interest. 
3.4. Subregionalism in Central Europe 
Central Europe shares an interconnected security complex. The Visegrad member states, 
bound within a geographic area, have developed overlapping national interests which can be 
addressed by a regulatory mechanism. The regulatory mechanism can, in part, be seen as the 
institution of subregional cooperation. The focus on Central Europe as a unique region, 
especially in security and defence issue brings up the important issue of cooperating within a 
subregional framework. The Visegrad Group organization, by its nature, is a subregional 
organization. Subregionalism, therefore, provides an ideal framework through which to 
investigate the relationships within in the regional group of Europe. ―Sub-regional frameworks 
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can examine issues of shared importance that institutions or organizations with broader 
memberships are unable or unwilling to address, and such frameworks can assist in the 
management of immediate and pressing local problems‖66.  
Renata Dwan defines subregionalism as, ―a process of regularized, significant political 
and economic interaction among a group of neighbouring states. This interaction takes place 
between national governments, local authorities, private business and civil society actors across a 
wide range of issues‖67. This description holds true for the subregional groupings which have 
former in the Eastern bloc since the end of the Cold War. Visegrad is an alliance of nearby states, 
joint together with a number of similar national interest goals.  
Martin Dangerfield categorizes four types of subregional groupings: pioneer, substitute, 
involuntary alternative/substitute and complement/preaccession instrument
68
. These groups differ 
in the ―interplay between EU integration and subregional cooperation‖69. According to the 
author, a pioneer alliance is one which works to build regional integration and in turn, also 
influences the policies of the EU. A clear example of a pioneer cooperative is the Benelux union. 
A substitute type of grouping is one which is an alternative to EU integration. An example of 
such a group was the CMEA- the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. The third category is 
the involuntary alternative/substitute. Such a category would include countries such as Turkey 
and Ukraine, who seem to be in a state of stagnation in regards their progress towards to 
European Union membership. The final category Dangerfield categorizes is one of a 
complement/preaccession instrument. An organization of this nature is one created the purpose 
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of assisting integration with the European Union. According to the author this model is, ―specific 
to the post-1990 period and to EU candidates from post-communist Europe‖70. The Visegrad 
cooperative is an example of one such group.  
Subregional cooperation has been present in Europe for some time. Some of the best 
known subregional groupings include the Nordic Council, consisting of Denmark, Sweden, 
Norway, Finland and Iceland, and the Benelux Cooperation, consisting of Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg. Both of these groups were established in the 1950s. These 
subregional cooperatives have been some of the most successful models of inter-state 
cooperation on economic, social and defence issues. The presence of subregional groups was 
limited during the Cold War period. However after 1989, the number of subregional cooperative 
groups saw a significant increase. According to Martin Dangerfield, it is the surge in subregional 
groups which emerged at the post-Cold War period which, ―generated the need to understand the 
purpose, potential, and limitations‖ of these organizations71.   
The proliferation of subregional groups which emerged after 1989 include: the Baltic 
Cooperation (1994), BEAC- Barents Euro-Arctic Council (1995), Council of Baltic Sea States 
(1992), Nordic Baltic Cooperation (1992), CEFTA- Central European Free Trade Agreement 
(1992), CEI- Central European Initiative (1989) and Visegrad (1991). The subregional group of 
Visegrad was one of the organizations formed during the post-Cold War period.   
3.5. The Development of Visegrad 
Three main sub-regional groups exist in Central Europe. These subregional groups are: 
the Central European Initiative (CEI), the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) and 
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the Visegrad initiative. The CEI is the oldest of the subregional cooperation imitative in the 
region. The organization was formed in 1989 between Austria, Hungary, Italy and the former 
Soviet Republic of Yugoslavian. The principle function of this organization was to promote 
cooperation within member countries by re-establishing mutual connections after the fall of the 
communist bloc. Today the organization has grown to include eighteen member states 
throughout the region. Countries in the CEI aim to cooperate on issues of mutual policy interest 
as well as in shared economic development and improvements to the quality of life.  
CEFTA was created by the Visegrad countries in 1993 to foster economic cooperation. 
The primary aim of this organization is to advance trade and industry in a collective manner. 
Current member states include those countries which aim at EU membership and therefore the 
organization is a tool to facilitate their efforts at becoming EU members. Since gaining 
membership, the Visegrad countries are no longer members of CEFTA. The organization has 
expanded to include Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, 
Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo. The purpose of CEFTA is to serve as a free trade area and does 
not act as a forum for political goals. 
The Visegrad subregional group consists of four member states, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Poland. Visegrad came in to existence in February of 1991. At this time, 
the organization only had three members, as Czechoslovakia had not split in to Slovakia and the 
Czech Republic yet. Between the dates of 12th to 15
th
 of February 1991, the presidents, prime 
ministers and foreign ministers of these countries met in Budapest and signed the Declaration of 
the Co-operation of the Republic of Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republics, and the 
Republic of Poland on the Road to European Integration. The historically significant site of 
Visegrad castle was chosen for the meeting. Visegrad castle was the location where the Kings of 
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Hungary, Bohemia and Poland had met to discuss an alliance between their kingdoms in 1335. In 
choosing this site, it was clear that the member countries were trying to recreate a historical 
lineage of cooperation amongst the three countries.  
During its early years of existence, Visegrad was successful at achieving a number of 
immediate goals set out by its member states.  One of the primary goals of Visegrad countries 
was to separate themselves from the former Soviet bloc institutions of the Warsaw Pact and 
COMECON. According to Urban Rusnak, the newly founded Visegrad group were able to 
dismantle the Soviet legacy in Central Europe
72
. Within the first year of its existence, Visegrad 
cooperation successfully, ―dissolved both the military structures (1 April 1991) and the political 
structures (1 July 1991) of the Warsaw Pact, COMECON structures (28 June 1991) and above all 
the quick withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary by mid-1991‖73. 
According to Rusnak, working together also allocated the three countries a special status with the 
European Union accession discussions
74
.  
The Visegrad subregional group in it‘s over two decades of existence, has fluctuated in 
the degree of cooperation between member states and willingness to these states to use Visegrad 
as a platform for cooperation. The existence of the organization can be divided into three 
separate phases of existence. These phases are determined by the level of activity of the 
organization as well as its effectiveness. In addition, another prominent indicator differentiating 
each phase is the level of importance member states places on the organization. During some 
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phases, a great deal of hope and ambition was bestowed on Visegrad, whereas during other times 
the organization was seemingly abandoned.  
 For the purposes of exploring a fundamental background understanding of the 
development of the organization, I plan to utilize the categorizations created by Martin 
Dangerfield. According to Dangerfield, three distinct phases of preaccession Visegrad 
cooperation are identifiable. These three phases extend from 1990-1992, 1993-1998 and from 
1998-2004
75
. These phases ―represent not only episodes of relative activity and inactivity but 
also evolutionary stages in the focus and content of VG cooperation‖76.  
 The first period of Visegrad development was a successful period for cooperation on 
foreign policy issues. During these years the organization focused its efforts on disbanding the 
previous communist-era security infrastructure and integrating the system aims at accession to 
the European Union and NATO. This period also saw a burst of optimism and eagerness on the 
part of member states to cooperate. During this time, ―The success of subregional cooperation as 
an instrument to help expedite the key goals of external policy seems indisputable‖77. Visegrad 
members were successful at establishing key shared security goals for the organization as well as 
partaking in comprehensive ministerial dialogue over possible military cooperation. 
In the following period, the atmosphere of confidence in Visegrad drastically changed to 
a more sceptic outlook. Internal factors were important in shaping this period of Visegrad 
history. The division of Czechoslovakia, the tension over Hungarian ethnic minorities in the new 
state of Slovakia and the deteriorating situation of Slovakia in European integration all 
influenced this period of weak Visegrad cooperation. Member states had a great deal of 
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conflicting interests and had an increasingly difficult time finding areas of overlapping national 
interest. NATO was one of the primary points of contention. Hungary, Poland and Slovakia 
wanted Visegrad to coordinate their, approach to NATO. Unfortunately the Czech Republic 
disagreed with such Visegrad objectives. ―Czech Defence Minister Antonin Baudys refused to 
attend a meeting with his Visegrad counterparts to discuss such an approach and Czech Minister 
for Foreign Relations Josef Zieleniec stated that ‗we don‘t believe in organizing lobbies or 
pressure groups to knock on doors‘ ‖78. 
During this time, Slovakia was excluded from European Union and NATO accession 
negotiations due to internal developments in the country. To many this period seemed like the 
end of Visegrad. Despite the struggles of Visegrad between 1993 and 1998, Hungary and Poland 
still maintained bilateral cooperation and continued to argue in support of a Visegrad revival
79
. 
Ultimately, it was the pragmatic motivation for NATO membership which led to a resurgence of 
Visegrad cooperation. The third and final period of pre-accession development began in 1998 
with the change in government in the Czech Republic and Slovakia to a more pro-Visegrad 
leadership open to subregional cooperation. During this time it was the external dimensions of 
cooperation which kept the Visegrad organization in existence.  
With Vladimír Mečiar out of office, Slovakia began the process of ―catching-up‖ to the 
other Visegrad countries in terms of the European Union and NATO accession process.‖The 
revived VG held its inaugural meeting in Bratislava on 14 May 1999 and produced a framework 
for significant expansion of the scale and scope of cooperation… [which emphasized] various 
intra-VG cooperation activities … [on] Foreign Affairs…Internal Affairs…Education, Culture, 
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Society, Youth and Sports, Science, Technology; Environment; Infrastructure; Cross-border 
Cooperation‖80 .This period was also witness to some important internal changes in Visegrad. 
For the first time in the organization‘s existence an institutional framework for cooperation was 
established. This infrastructure consisted of regular meetings of government officials, a 
rotational Visegrad presidency, and formal financial commitments from states.  
3.6. Visegrad’s Time of Change 
 The revival of Visegrad as a cooperative body of member states reached its ultimate goal 
in 2004, when all four member states realized European Union and, earlier, NATO membership. 
With this, the organization was faced with an identity crisis. The future nature and aim of the 
Visegrad organization came under speculation. Some called for the end of the organization, but 
ultimately the organization‘s staying power continued. The role of cooperation within Visegrad 
in the post-accession period needed to be re-evaluated and further stipulated by the member 
states. A key point of consideration for the V4 is, ―whether the environment of the enlarged EU 
would combine with the cooperative tendencies already established and enable a distinct 
subregional entity within the EU to emerge… [or] leave VG to remain at best a vehicle for 
further internal cooperation‖81.  
After the Visegrad member states achieved European Union and NATO membership the 
organization did not dissolve. At this critical point in the organization‘s existence, the member 
countries decided that Visegrad was still a viable organization for subregional cooperation in 
Central Europe. The four, ―governments decided that their cooperation vehicle was a valuable 
one and should be continued. The declaration of the VG Prime Ministers‘ meeting held in the 
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Czech Republic on 12 May 2004 was meant to serve the purpose of redefining and updating the 
mission of the VG‖82. At this time talks continued about future cooperation considerations for 
the organization spanning from education initiatives, economic openness and interesting 
cooperation in regards to defence and security. Ideas of common military cooperation in the form 
of joint solider training, weapons and supply procurement and shared testing facilities for 
munitions and equipment were all discussed. Member countries went as far as to discuss the 
viability of country specific specialization, so as to reduce overlap in training and expenditure on 
resources in the region. 
Despite the shifting security architecture, and the increase in soft security cooperation, 
European states continue to have some serious points of contention. While some people argue for 
a boom in the European environment of cooperation and mutual comradery, the reality is that 
European states have not been able to find an effective consensus for cooperation in foreign 
policy and defence issues. Instead, a great deal of overlap in military expenditure and defence 
capabilities exists. Such overlap, as opposed to more streamlined measures of cooperation, 
results in high expenditures for bureaucracy, training and equipment. 
The very fact that countries are unable to find a consensus on hard security matters or 
jeopardize their sovereignty on this subject is an important point to consider. Despite what some 
would point to as a decrease in the interest and the need for hard security dialogue, I suggest that 
this is still a pressing issue. The disagreements and differences between states regarding this 
issue implies that it will take more attention and effort to work out a compromise. 
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In the overall trend throughout Europe has been a tendency towards a decrease in military 
spending. This trend applies for the Central European countries as well. Most of the NATO 
member countries have not been able to meet the two percent of GDP financial membership 
allocation to the organization. The global financial crisis has put pressure on governments in 
Central Europe, and throughout Europe, to reduce spending and to cut costs. Some suggest that 
the crisis might be the final motivational factor necessary to jump-start further actual defence 
cooperation in the region. The Visegrad Security Cooperation Initiative‘s Policy Paper on 
security found that cooperation on security and defence between member states ―is not 
systematic, sufficient, and that there is a space for further improvement‖83 .Visegrad member 
states have continued to meet ahead of European Union summits in order to coordinate their 
position on issues to be addressed. If the four countries are able to work together within the EU, 
they can be a powerful voice. An important point to note is that jointly they hold ―as much EU 
voting power as France and Germany combined‖84.  
4. Methodology 
 The focus of my dissertation is on defence and security cooperation in the small states of 
Central Europe. The nature of the system plays an important role in neorealist theory. The 
environment of cooperation in the region is influenced by a number of important factors 
according to the theory of neorealism. The aim is therefore to test the theory against reality, or in 
other words, to see whether predictions of theory exist in actuality on the ground. Neorealism is 
the preferred paradigm for looking at state defence behaviour because it provides a platform 
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from which to, ―understand the nature of the security threats presented by the international 
system and the strategy options states must pursue to survive and prosper in the system‖ (Baylis 
& Smith 2006: 210). Through neorealism one can study how security concerns are connected to 
issues of power and survival. These, according to the theory, are the fundamental necessities of 
state existence.  
Neorealism is generally understood to be the best framework through which to explore 
defence, security and military cooperation. The nature of the system is shaped by the desires of 
its member states. This case holds true for the Visegrad group, especially since the organization 
has few institutions and possesses a flexible nature of cooperation. Some opposing theories to 
neorealism include neoliberalism and neofunctionalism. These competing theories are important 
to consider and therefore give an interesting perspective on the possibilities of cooperation. I 
chose to focus my dissertation on neorealism because it is best suited for defence and security 
purposes. The other theories are capable of explaining why states cooperate on economic, social 
or cultural levels, but such considerations are outside the realm of this analysis.  
 When reality is observed through the neorealist paradigm certain patterns of behaviour 
can be expected. Neorealism as a well tested theory, says that states are not willing to cooperate 
on security matters. As such, Central European states are expected to not cooperate on security 
and defence issues. Military capacity is seen as the foundation of state sovereignty and survival. 
Therefore the presence of an independent and capable military structure is important to every 
state. This holds true for the small Central European states being observed in this analysis. Why 
then, do these states participate in certain areas of security and defence cooperation? Through 
this analysis I seek to explore whether neorealism is able to explain cooperation in Central 
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Europe. I also hope to consider whether the role of subregionalism and subregional influences 
play a unique part in the neorealist paradigm.   
Neorealism has generally focused on great power states due in part to their undeniable 
influence. In the years following the Cold War, a number of new small states appeared in the 
European context. The trend towards globalization and integration has resulted in a new Europe 
which is increasingly tied together on many platforms. The survival and stability both of the 
Central European and the overall European environment hinges on the stability of its member 
states. The present environment is one in which the conditions are ripe to further cooperation on 
defence and security matter in Central Europe. Member states have voiced their willingness to 
jumpstart a new chapter for the Visegrad organization. Other factors which encourage 
cooperation in the region have been the financial crisis, the limited defence capabilities of 
individual states and the aging military hardware of these countries. So while neorealism expects 
states not to cooperate on defence issues, the reality is that a great deal of dialogue and some 
would say interest, precipitates the matter. 
 In order to explore this paradox, I firstly embarked on an examination of the neorealist 
paradigm. I looked at both classical realism as well as more modern takes on the theory. Two of 
the best known offshoots of classical neorealism in terms of security and defence, are defensive 
and offensive neorealism. Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer have taken great strides at 
explaining the nature of the system through these paradigms. Neorealism and especially 
offensive neorealism makes notable advancements at explaining some of the key obstacles to 
cooperation. In an effort to investigate distinctive aspects to the paradox of military cooperation 
through a neorealist framework, I will break-down the analysis to a number of key important 
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questions to address on the subject matter. The analysis will be executed primarily though a 
discourse analysis supplemented by empirical evidence of cooperation.  
To begin my analysis, I will take a look at the most fundamental condition for state 
survival in neorealism. In the neorealist paradigm, states primary concern is over self-
sustainability. I seek to explore whether the neorealist decree of an anarchic system still holds 
true as a concern for small Central European states today. Many people have heralded the dawn 
of a new peaceful, stable and organized international environment in Europe. But how much do 
states believe in the stability of the new environment and how much are they still concerned over 
the neorealist labelled ‗anarchic system‘? In order to explore this question I will look to speeches 
and press statements from foreign ministers, defence ministers and top decision making 
government elites in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. I seek to determine whether 
concerns over instability of the system and concerns over the intentions of neighbours and allies 
appear in these texts. 
According to neorealism, one of the key precursors to the hesitation of states to cooperate 
is the concern over entrapment. But despite such concerns over entrapment, all four of the 
Visegrad countries are members of the European Union and NATO. Surely the intensive 
institutionalisation undertaken by the Visegrad countries in order to gain membership have 
increased the threat of entrapment. Why then, does this feature persist, and if it does persist, then 
does further defence cooperation continue to be plausible? To analyse the possibility of 
overcoming concerns over entrapment, I will explore what the literature says on present 
cooperation and successful projects between the member countries of these organizations. To 
effectively explore this question it is necessary to examine policy papers and discussion papers 
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published by think-tanks and policy institutes, we well as government publications by the 
Defence Ministries of the countries in question. 
If I find that states are now willing to give up their aspects of their military sovereignty, 
whether it is completely in the form of joint militaries or partially through factors such as pooling 
of resources, I would like to examine the extent of this phenomenon. I aim to look at whether the 
small Central European states coordinate or cooperate on security matters. I make a key point to 
discover what exactly constitutes defence cooperation in order to establish its limits in the 
Central European context; if such a limit exists on cooperation on security matters. I attempted to 
look at the extent to which such cooperation exists in Central Europe and the conditions under 
which they exist. The purpose of such an analysis is to look at whether neorealism is a complete 
fit for the reality of state behaviour in Central Europe. I seek to explore whether neorealism is 
successful at establishing what security cooperation is and what it is not. In order to complete 
this part of the analysis I will take a look at both previously completed analysis and empirical 
evidence of cooperation of countries in the region. I plan to pay special attention to publications 
of bilateral security cooperation between Visegrad countries and publications released by 
Visegrad regarding this topic. I seek to discover whether neorealism is sufficient to explain 
reality or whether other factors, such a subregionalism, should be taken into account when 
looking at the reality. 
Relative power is an important aspect of neorealist theory. The relative power, as 
opposed to absolute power, is fundamental to relations between states. Since the ultimate goal of 
any theory is therefore to find patterns within reality, applying such patterns in conjunction with 
systematic input such as the size of a state or its geographic location should yield consistent 
predictions. The relatively large size and power of Poland, in comparison to Hungary, the Czech 
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Republic and Slovakia is an important point to consider. Does Poland‘s relative power make it a 
hegemonic force in the region? Could the smaller states fear Poland as a possible hegemonic 
power? And could they be engaging in balancing behaviour against Poland? Could this be the 
reason for the continued dialogue, but modest tangible results in defence cooperation in Central 
Europe? To address these questions I will review empirical data on the Visegrad countries. The 
IISS was one of the most informative sources of defence spending, weapons allocation and 
military purchases of the states. I used this source and information provided by government 
publications to research and overview the data on such aspects as defence spending in a 
systematic manner.  
Through my analysis I anticipate my research to fill in some of the gaps neorealist theory 
faces in the context of Central European reality. My analysis is not intended to be an overarching 
basis through which to look at all examples of subregional cooperation, or even all small state 
subregional cooperatives. I seek to explore whether this arrangement holds true for this region 
only. I seek to explore whether neorealism is realized in the possibility of defence cooperation of 
small Visegrad states.  I seek to validate or refute the extent to whether it is applicable to the 
region. I aim to execute such a study primarily though a discourse analysis rather than 
quantitative military dissertation on this subject.  
5. Applying the Theory to the Region 
5.1. Aspects of the System 
According to neorealism the nature of the system is one of anarchy. In such a system 
states are faced with an every present state of uncertainty. This uncertainty is encompassed by 
concerns over state survival as well as the intentions of other states. As states seek to improve 
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their own power and position in the system they inevitably appear threatening to other states. 
Actual and latent military presence is the ultimate representation of power. Therefore an increase 
in power would increase a state‘s position in the system. In such a system, states seek to provide 
guarantees for their survival. One of the fundamental guarantees for state survival is the presence 
of an effective and effectual military to protect the territorial space of the state.  
The depth and breadth of integration within the European context is unprecedented in 
history. States in this system have engaged in cooperation on a wide ranging of policies. There 
exists a general agreement that the new system of Europe brings with it an environment of peace 
between member states, perpetuated by inter-dependence and institutionalization. ―The first, and 
perhaps largely underappreciated, advantage of the current situation in Europe is that there is a 
widespread absence of a direct military threat to most of the small states on the continent
85
. With 
the downfall of the Soviet Union, the continent of Europe saw the end of their biggest traditional 
security threat.  
In the neorealist perspective, for pragmatic reasons the Central European states sought to 
assimilate into the institutional framework after the Cold War. ―After the collapse of the Soviet 
bloc, the post-communist small states as ‗security orphans‘ of the Cold War are put in a highly 
fragmented, post-imperial security vacuum, a historically unique situation in Central/Eastern 
Europe‖86. Through integration, these states were increasing their security by transcending 
isolation. The Central European states felt a growing instability after the Cold War and sought to 
re-assimilate with the West in order to address such concerns of security and instability.  
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Since the end of the Cold War, Europe has witness a decrease in the threat of traditionally 
understood military confrontation between states. ―Within collective security systems, norms are 
opposed to confrontation and the use of force to settle disputes‖87. The collective security nature 
of Europe has resulted in a system in which the probability of conventional armed offensive 
behaviour and war between states is unlikely. The Central European states, as members of the 
European Union now fall under such structural constraints. Disputes and other disagreements 
between member countries are now addressed through institutional frameworks established by 
the European Union. Confrontation between states is discouraged in the present day European 
context as members have a lot more to lose through aggressive behaviour in such a system. The 
nature of the system ensures that there is a lot of pressure on states to act according to established 
norms. Such a measure of physical security binds member states into a multilateral agreement 
and results in a lack of revisionist states in present day Europe.  Despite such a development, 
concerns over security and survival of the state still exist.  
The primary concern Central European states have is over the reliability of the current 
system. ―A transition to a collective security system raises anew for small states the issue of 
reliability. Small states cannot be confident that the system would come to their aid in the 
eventuality of aggression from inside or from outside the system‖88. This is an interest point to 
consider. Based on the earlier description it can be inferred that the system limits the possibility 
for aggressive state behaviour within the system. If this aspect of reality holds true, then the 
apprehension over the reliability of the system to protect the survival of its members should no 
long be of concern to the states. The small Central European states in the new European context 
should not fear the reliability of the system coming to their aid in case of attack. Member states 
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should be confident that the infrastructure present would protect them from internal threat. Most 
of all, states should no long feel threatened by the actions or intentions of other member states.  
In reality, states cannot be certain that the system will come to their aid. As stated 
through the neorealist paradigm, states can never be completely sure of the benevolent, or 
otherwise, intentions of other states. Publications produced by each of the small states in 
question reflect a need to maintain a military presence to safeguard sovereign territory as a last 
resort. If states believe in the reliability of the system, they could be more inclined to cooperate 
on security and military matters. If state survival was not an issue states might be more willing to 
forego aspects of their sovereignty to pursue mutual security goals. Neorealism states that 
countries will only look to increase secondary aspect of security when their survival is not being 
threatened. As such, a successful system of cooperation might even entail the jointing of military 
units, the creation of specialization of each country or even the start of a pan-European army to 
replace individual state military forces. 
The nature of the international system is described in the opening lines of the Military 
Strategy of the Czech Republic‘s Ministry of Defence. The publication describes the new 
international atmosphere as being in a state of flux. As such, new sorts of concerns have emerged 
for the Czech Republic. ― The current global security environment can be generally  
characterized  by  its  growing complexity, variability, unpredictability and  a marked  
asymmetry  which  render  it  a subject to continuous re-evaluation. Extremism, terrorism, 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery including ballistic 
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missiles rank among the gravest threats that can directly or indirectly impact security interests of 
the Czech Republic.‖89 
The document continues on to describe some of the major points of concern that the 
Ministry of Defence intends to focus its efforts on. The Czech Republic as such, is voices 
concern over the stability of the system. ―Other serious threats could originate from regional 
crises caused by long-lasting unresolved problems that can escalate into intrastate or interstate 
armed conflicts.‖90 This point is particular worth mentioning for the purposes of this analysis. 
The Defence Ministry makes direct reference to concerns within the system over instability 
between states. The anarchic nature of the system is noticeably visible through this statement. So 
while the actual threat of instability might be rather low in Europe today, the changing nature of 
the environment results in an uncertain future. The potential for a change in the circumstances of 
international relations between states is evident. The possibility of a rise in instability and the 
potential impermanence of relations between states is always a possibility.  
―It is also apparent that growing economic and military power of some countries may 
position them to pursue their national interests in a more aggressive manner threatening to use 
and, in extreme cases, actually using military force‖91. According to neorealism the driving force 
behind the nature of the system is the desire of states to increase their relative power. Thus the 
desire to increase power can never correspond to the national interest of other states. This aspect 
of neorealism is evident from the above mentioned quote. The expectation of the Czech Republic 
and the expectation of neorealism match in this regard. ―Nevertheless, a large-scale conventional 
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conflict in the territories of NATO or EU member states is still highly unlikely in a foreseeable 
future.‖92 Proving that the structural constraints provided by NATO and the EU can contain state 
behaviour but not state ambition.  
Despite the nature of insecurity, the possibility of cooperation is also taken into account 
in the defence document. ―The Armed Forces are being designed as a single set of efficiently 
structured, universally usable, interoperable and deployable forces, which are capable of joint 
action and coordination   with civilian actors, and fully utilize advantages of international 
cooperation‖93. The Czech Republic as such sets the limit to cooperation on joint action and 
interoperability of forces. They do not wish to give up their military for a pan-European military 
structure, but they are willing to cooperate in non-vital military aspects. Such declarations of the 
willingness to cooperate seem to be in apparent contradiction with the neorealist nature of the 
system. It appears that despite uncertainty in the system and concerns over the lasting nature of 
relations between states, the Czech Republic is still willing to engage in defence cooperation 
with other member countries. This paradox shows a weakness of the neorealist theory.  
To increase cooperation between states, German Defence Minister Karl-Theodor zu 
Guttenberg suggests that a helpful took would be qualifying which aspects of defence were 
necessary to sovereignty and which aspects were open to cooperation. ―The plan would first 
involve defining those domestic defence capabilities that were absolutely necessary for 
individual EU member states, then ascertaining the areas in which cooperation could bring 
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savings, and, finally, allocating defence specialties to individual countries, which would then 
make their defence resources available to other EU members in the case of emergencies‖94. 
Next in the case of Slovakia, the Defence Ministry voiced a similar environment of 
concerns and challenges. The basic goal of the defence policy of the Slovak Republic is, ―the 
sovereign right to guarantee its own security‖95.  The basic need of the state to safeguard its 
survival is defined by neorealist theory. The primary objective of the state is one of a self-help 
nature and therefore the basic goal of the defence policy of the Slovak Republic reflects its need 
to provide security for its citizens and to guarantee defence of the state, with reliance on its own 
forces. As such, the primary goal is for self-reliance on security. The document also mentions the 
secondary possibility for inter-state cooperation on security matters. So while the purpose of the 
defence sector of the Slovak Republic is to provide for the security of the state, the prospect of 
cooperation is also suggested, again raising the paradox.  
In the official government publication released by Slovakia, concerns over instability of 
the system can also be seen. The Slovak Republic has concerns over uncertainty and the 
impermanence of current relations between European states in the system. The characteristic of 
reality as such support the viability of the theory of neorealism. The neorealist paradigm regards 
the system as anarchic and unstable as therefore there exists the, ―impossibility to dismiss 
completely the likelihood of an emergence of an extensive conventional armed conflict in the 
Euro-Atlantic area despite the sustained effort to lower the risks associated with this threat‖96. So 
while the current system is one of largely peaceful relations and cooperation amongst states, the 
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potential for this situation to change is still present. The important aspect to remember is 
therefore evidence exists of the concerns of states over instability in the system, and therefore the 
anarchy of the system. ―The Slovak Republic is not threatened by an imminent extensive 
conventional military conflict... [but rather through] increased instability and uncertainty, which 
are seconded by high levels of insecurity, unpredictability, and an increasing potential for the 
development of unexpected crisis situations‖97. 
The national security strategy of Hungary is in some ways unique compared to the 
previously two examined small Central European states. The Hungarian government has shown 
steady interest in the welfare of the significant groups of ethnic Hungarian people living outside 
of the country in neighbouring states. This phenomenon is a result of the historical events 
surrounding the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire following the First World War. The 
long-term effect of this historical memory means that, ―Hungary remained set apart from its 
neighbours because some three million ethnic Hungarians live in neighbouring countries. It has 
therefore become part of Hungarian foreign policy to champion the rights of ethnic minorities all 
over Europe‖98. The national interest of Hungary to adjust for protective measure of ethnic 
Hungarians in foreign countries has put the country at odds with the desire of neighbouring states 
for decisive state sovereignty. Meddling in the internal affairs of other states is viewed as 
threatening behaviour. By taking clear interest in a group of people residing within the sovereign 
borders of another state, Hungary is viewed as potentially seeking to increase its power. ―The 
Republic of Hungary provides for the security, prosperity and advancement of its citizens, as 
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well as for the preservation of the cultural heritage and identity of the Hungarian people.‖99 By 
increasing its power, Hungary‘s intentions are believed to be the country actively looking to 
control the policies of other states, in an effort to accommodate its own national interests.   
In regards to military sovereignty, Lt. Col. Imre Takács, a senior staff officer in the 
Hungarian Ministry of Defence considers the defence division of Hungary a vital division of the 
state institutional structure, ―and as such are indispensable elements of the nation‘s security and 
the enforcement of its national interest. The Hungarian Defence Forces are entrusted with the 
responsibility to defend the territorial integrity and airspace of Hungary, secure the borders of the 
state, and project real deterrent force.‖100 This statement reinforces the importance of a sovereign 
military force for the protection and survival of the state. Hungary, along with the other small 
Central European states explored in this analysis all believe that an active and effective military 
presence is essential to the state. Since the system is viewed as unstable, the militaries of these 
countries are necessary to guaranteeing a safeguard if the current balance of power between state 
relations in the system should shift and aggressive states should emerge. The system is in a state 
of flux: 
Despite the necessity for an independent military presence, Hungary, in a similar manner 
to the other two small states, states its willingness to cooperate on security matter on an 
international scale. ―Hungary is not threatened by military aggression, and the risk of any other 
traditional type of threat is also minimal. At the same time, new challenges and threats have 
emerged that can be addressed effectively only through a governmental stance that co-ordinates 
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our national efforts, and a well-focused development of our capabilities and their flexible 
application, as well as through wide-ranging international co-operation.‖101 This shows evidence 
against the paradigm of neorealism. So despite the natural inclination of states towards self-
interest, all three of the small Central European states have voiced their active interest in defence 
cooperation. 
5.2. Obstacles and Concerns  
 All three of the small Central European countries in this analysis state their willingness to 
engage in inter-state cooperation on security and defence matters with other member states. In 
the defence strategy statements released by these countries, all make reference to the changing 
nature of the system towards a more interconnected and integrated environment. The shift 
towards interdependence and cooperation between countries also increases the concern over state 
entrapment. In political terms, entrapment refers to an instance in which an actor obligates 
himself to certain commitments to other states. Such a commitment can come in the form of bi-
lateral or multi-lateral agreements and political statements.  
The members of NATO have committed themselves to the protection of all member 
states, so that if one member gets attacked, all other member states would be obligated to aid 
him. Entrapment is feared by states because in certain agreements, states cannot withdraw 
commitments or choose to not adhere to the mandates of the agreement without facing 
consequences. If a state foregoes its obligations in an agreement it can risk negative 
repercussions from other states, isolation, as well as an overall negative image. The danger of 
entrapment is intensified when state have very limited resources. In such an instance states run 
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the possibility of over-extending themselves and their resources, leaving them weak and 
vulnerable. States fear being entrapped, or committed to fighting a cause or expending resources 
on an issue which is not of national interest. Such concerns are particularly strong in small states. 
The nature of small states in the system is therefore unique. 
The fear over entrapment is one of the primary deterrents to cooperation. According to 
Mearsheimer‘s offensive neorealism, states fear entrapment more than they fear the likelihood of 
abandonment and being left out of the arrangements. Despite such concerns over entrapment, 
plenty of dialogue exists between member countries on the matter of defence and security 
cooperation. The paradox is that states continue to pursue cooperation despite the contradictory 
circumstances and concerns over the stability of the system. ―The collective security future 
provides, in principle, a measure of physical security, locks the great powers into a multilateral 
arrangement, allows for small-state input and participation in the system, and reduces concerns 
over sovereignty and national identity which would attend an integrative Europe‖102. 
The Central European states in question have made some tangible contributions to 
international defence initiatives. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia have contributed 
troops to a number of different NATO, UN and EU initiatives. A number of tangible examples of 
military cooperation include the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in NATO between the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) between Slovakia 
and Hungary and forces initially sent to Iraq by Poland and Slovakia.  
The Central European states have also showed initiative in cooperating with regards to 
the European Union Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP). The CFSP is an attempt of the 
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EU to build a collective foreign policy position. The ESDP deals with the EU‘s external 
collective foreign policy. Despite many developments in other aspects of integration, the 
European Union still acts primarily as an inter-governmental unit in regards to foreign policy. 
Member states for the most part, control their own relations with other states. The Central 
European states have established their willingness to cooperate in the ESDP and to provide 
actual military forces for EU initiatives. Committed resources include: ―Mechanised infantry 
(Hungary – 1 battalion, the Czech Republic – 1 battalion, Slovakia – 1 company), NBC 
protection units (the Czech Republic – 1 company, Slovakia – mobile laboratory and detection 
group), special forces (the Czech Republic – 1 company), air defence units (Hungary), military 
police (Slovakia – 1 company), military medicine (the Czech Republic – 1 field hospital or 
medical battalion, Slovakia – 1 field hospital), engineers (Slovakia – mine clearance unit), 
several helicopters and transport aircraft (the Czech Republic... and Slovakia)‖103.  
In the 2010 Strategic Concept published by NATO after the November Lisbon Summit, 
the newly specified guidelines of the organization were defined.  NATO will focus on three core 
tasks: ―collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security‖104. In the document, the 
focus on Central European states working in cooperation through NATO institutions is affirmed. 
According to Arūnas Molis a reason for this could be to reduce some of the power imbalance 
from being a small state. ―In order to avoid unilateral manipulation of large actors small states 
are sometimes inclined to sacrifice some of their autonomy and join cooperation structures of 
                                                          
103
 Khol, ‗Policies of the Visegrad‘, p. 20. 
104
 ‗Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty  Organisation‘, 
NATO, 2010, <http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf> [accessed 12 May 2011], 
(pt.4,a,b,c). 
Page | 62  
 
different natures These structures may partially eliminate the imbalance of political influence, 
military power and economic potential in the bilateral relations with the large states‖105. 
Mearsheimer argues that international institutions are irrelevant because they ―merely 
reflect state interests and politics and do no exert any independent effects on the struggle for 
power‖106. Neorealism would argue that the abovementioned examples of cooperation exist only 
because of it is the present will of states to cooperate. As such, cooperation is currently beneficial 
to the national interests of the small Central European states. The European Union and NATO 
are not supranational organizations which control the behaviour of states but are merely as strong 
as the present commitment their members. If cooperation in these organizations becomes too 
expensive for the small Central European states, or if states no longer see cooperation as a direct 
benefit to their states, then the expectation is that they will no longer cooperate.  
 Present cooperation despite concerns for entrapment continue for the small Central 
European states. There has also been a renewed interest in capability pooling and sharing. The 
global financial crisis is believed to be one of the primary stimuli for such considerations 
between states. In October of 2010, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 
―implored Alliance governments to coordinate their approach to defence cuts and think seriously 
about pooling capabilities and enhancing role specialisation, enabling one country to give up 
certain capabilities in the knowledge that another would provide it‖107. The leader of NATO was 
asking its members to consider giving up some of the last embodiments of state sovereignty; 
their military capacities. This is in clear contrast to state behaviour according to neorealism, and 
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as such defence specialisation is not expected to happen. The budget cuts in most European cuts 
have resulted in a considerable decrease in the capacity of these countries both to contribute to 
organization such as NATO and also to defend themselves in case of attack. ―There is a point 
where you are no longer cutting fat; you‘re cutting into muscle, and then into bone... Cuts can go 
too far. We have to avoid cutting so deep that we won‘t, in the future, be able to defend the 
security on which our economic prosperity rests‖108. 
 If defence pooling is successful it would greatly question the integrity of neorealism‘s 
basic claims. In an informal meeting of EU defence ministers on 23-24 September, ―the EU‘s 
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Baroness Catherine Ashton, argued 
that EU member governments should cooperate more in order to deliver capability and focus 
‗spending on our agreed priorities. We need to explore ways of pooling and sharing. Our existing 
resources need to better fit out needs‖109. The nature of the present economic constraints 
encourages such pooling and defence specialization to be pursued despite the previously 
mentioned obstacles and therefore illustrates a weakness of neorealism.  
In terms of financial benefits, the next logical step would be for states in such a system to 
specialize their militaries. In other words, certain states would focus on certain specific 
capabilities, such as biological weapons. By doing this, the duplication present in the defence 
industries of the European context would decrease. As such, states would have to rely on the 
trust between members that if something was to occur and the specialized unit of one country 
would come to the aid of another. The clear problem with this is that, as witnessed in the earlier 
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sections of this analysis, full trust does not exist between the member states. A clear concern is 
the reliability of the system due to anarchy. If for example, there is a biological weapons attack 
on multiple members within the system then the country with this specialized capability will 
undeniably help itself first. The self-help nature of the system stipulates that states will address 
their own interests first. If there are not enough capabilities to aid all the affected countries, then 
those countries are left without a means to address the crisis. Being entrapped in such a situation 
is very unfavourable to small states. 
 State cooperation might be more feasible between states on certain aspects of defence 
more than others. Certain facilities might be viewed as more vital to state survival, while others 
might be viewed as less fundamental and therefore more plausible for cooperation. This 
―acknowledges that there will be capabilities that are likely to remain purely national because 
governments consider them essential for sovereignty and autonomy‖110.  
The possibility of pooling resources is a more viable option for cooperation between 
states. ―Pooling might be easier because the governments involved would retain autonomy in 
decision-making, whereas role and task specialisation would entail a stronger political 
commitment and would probably necessitate mutually binding guarantees that governments – 
due to parliamentary control over the decision to deploy forces abroad, for example – might be 
unwilling or unable to give‖111. If the small Central European states were to pool their resources, 
they would still have individual control over their own troops. The countries would therefore not 
have to rely on trust, but could work together in a favourable situation and not risk entrapment.   
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The hesitation of states to participate in defence specialisation raises an interesting point 
again of the neorealist argument with regards to entrapment. If the commitment to specialize 
would, ―entail a stronger political commitment,‖ states likely fear being entrapped in such a 
situation. Task specialisation would commit states to come to the aid of a fellow member state in 
a situation where a member state is faced with an actual threat. The need for this specialization in 
a number of member states might result in a large financial burden and a feeling of over-
extending oneself. If governments were to reply on the EU to regulate such specializations, 
safeguards would have to be present which would ensure that the capability would be available 
to each member state when needed
112
.  
 ―Distinguishing between sovereign capabilities, capabilities that could be pooled and 
capabilities where role and task specialisation might be appropriate should make it easier to 
move from expression of political intent to concrete measures and implementation‖113.In order to 
investigate what can be done in this field it is worthwhile to explore some past and present 
examples of state capability pooling. Some successful examples of pooling capabilities between 
European states included the Helicopter Training Programme (HTP) of the European Defence 
Agency (EDA). All three of the small Central European states have agreed to make contributions 
to the EDA. The organization was created in order to maintain the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP) and to help ensure its increased presence. The primary aim of the EDA 
is to aid the European Union in creating a credible military force, emphasize by the EU Rapid 
Reaction Battlegroups to which the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia have all committed 
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troops. The three small Central European states have pledged troops to future European Union 
rapid response battlegroups. From June to December 2012, Hungary and Slovakia will be 
contributing members to Italy and the Czech Republic will be a contributor to the battlegroup 
lead by Germany
114
. 
The HTP programme has aims to bring together air crew personnel from the varying 
member countries for joint training operations. ―The European Helicopter Training Programme 
was approved by Ministers of Defence in November 2009 to increase in the short-term the 
availability of helicopters for crisis management operations. The Programme started in 2010 and 
consists of two live exercises per year - one focusing on individual training and one on 
interoperability and operational tactics‖115. This programme is one of the best success stories of 
the possibility of capability pooling. By soldiers taking part in joint-training they are able to 
increase the interoperability of forces, they are able to prepare for more varied circumstances and 
they are also able to familiarized themselves with working with soldiers from other countries. 
According to IISS, since October 2009, approximately 360 air crew have taken part in the ―live 
exercises and theoretical modules‖116. 
 This analysis shows that some patterns of developments have been made in defence 
cooperation, namely in the pooling of the training of troops. According to neorealism, states are 
not expected to cooperate on defence matters. This aspect of reality seems to be in conflict with 
the expected behaviour of states set up by the paradigm. It could be possible that defence was not 
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qualified entirely in the theory of neorealism. In other words, what defence sovereignty entails in 
actuality is just a free-standing and independent military force capable of defending the country, 
thereby allowing for states to cooperate on defence issues which do not work against the self-
governing military. Secondary aspects of defence, such as the training of troops and, possibly, 
the joint procurement of weapons might not be essential for maintaining state sovereignty. 
Pooling of resources falls within the limits of cooperation, but the specialization of troops falls 
outside this limit in the small state Central European context.  
―According to the deputy chief executive for strategy, Carlo Magrassi, the EDA will 
continue to press member states for harmonised defence requirements, combined R&D 
investment, the promotion of effective cooperative armaments programmes and increased market 
competition in defence procurement‖117. Despite the success of the aforementioned programmes 
concern over the reliability of the commitment of states to the present programmes and to future 
ones continue to exist. There is the potential for great financial benefit to the continued progress 
in streamlining the defence industry of the European Union. This again reflects the default 
desires of states to put national interests first.  
Under the EU Stability and Growth Pact, members state are required to maintain budget 
deficits below 3 percent of GDP and public debt of less than 60 percent of GDP. At the same 
time NATO asks each of its members to annually allocate a minimum of 2 percent of GDP 
towards defence. This has the potential to be of conflicting interest to the states which are both 
EU and NATO members; such as the three Central European states in this analysis. The current 
trend of an overall decrease in the defence budgets of member states has put strain on states to 
                                                          
117
 IISS – The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Abingdon: Taylor & Francis, The Military Balance 2011: 
Annual Assessment of the Military Capabilities and Defence Economics ,, 2011, [accessed by RFE Library on 8 
March 2011], (p. 77). 
Page | 68  
 
meet these contribution obligations. According to neorealism, states have a tendency to prioritize 
in favour of their national interests. Carlo Magrassi cautioned in a speech on 5 October in 
Brussels that EU ―Member States might fall back in their traditional behaviour of finding purely 
national solutions, perhaps driven by protecting national industrial interests‖ 118. Such a shift 
might lead to security vulnerabilities.   
The Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia all take part in the collective defence training 
cooperative launched by the EDA. In a recent publication released on 12 May 2011 on the 
website of AgustaWestland, an Anglo-Italian helicopter design and manufacturing company, the 
three small Central European countries recently further invested in joint helicopter training with 
a number of other EU member states. ―AgustaWestland, a Finmeccanica company, is pleased to 
announce that it has signed a contract with the European Defence Agency for the provision of an 
Interim Helicopter Tactics Training Service. In this Category B EDA programme the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom (the contributing 
Member States) have formally agreed to collaborate in the procurement of this training service. 
The training will help prepare contributing Member States‘ helicopter crews for joint deployment 
on allied military operations at the same time as they develop their own indigenous tactics 
training capabilities‖119 . The pooling of helicopter training is therefore within the current 
boundaries of cooperation.  
In an interview with Defence Management Journal conducted on 18 April 2011, Claude-
France Arnould, Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency highlighted the continued 
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importance of EDA programs and of pooling defence strategies. Taking part in such initiatives as 
the HTP, allows states to go further collectively than they might otherwise be able to on their 
own. ―Declining defence budgets are a reality. Facing the challenges resulting from these cuts – 
on average 5-10 per cent across Europe – the agency offers the opportunity for multinational 
cooperation, thus allowing member states to improve capabilities they might not otherwise be 
able to do on their own. I am convinced that EDA and its model of cooperation are part of the 
solution. A good example is the ongoing positive discussion on pooling & sharing initiatives. 
Ministers are aware they have to do more with less. And this is exactly what they know we can 
provide: a platform to deliver in a more efficient way‖120.  
Joint procurement of military hardware has also been suggested as a possible platform for 
effective state cooperation between the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia on defence 
matters. Defence procurement refers to the practice of collective armament purchases by two or 
more countries. The advantages of procuring weapons together is twofold. Primarily, purchasing 
more pieces at once allows the producer to offer the product at a lower cost. Secondly, by 
working together states have a stronger bargaining power and are therefore able to negotiate 
lower prices for armaments. Interoperability and cooperation would also be facilitated once 
multiple armed forces are operating on the same equipment. The EDA has established a code of 
conduct for the practice of cooperate armament procurement. The code of conduct is intended to 
regulate the practice by setting guidelines which promote transparent and competitive 
procurement.  
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Nick Witney, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations and 
former head of the European Defence Agency is in acknowledges the possibility of such non-
critical forms of defence cooperatives.―I‘m personally sceptical about multi-state 
units...however; there are sectors where reinforced cooperation is politically acceptable, for 
example in research and development, and in defence infrastructure. There is no reason why each 
country should have its own structures to maintain and repair equipment. The same applies for 
weapons testing, munitions and explosives evaluation, wind tunnels used for aircraft design and 
warship testing basins‖121.  
If states continue to successfully engage in defence cooperation there will understandably 
need to be an atmosphere of reasonably corresponding security interests. The political motivation 
to continue efforts to cooperate will also be an important factor in the success or failure of such 
endeavours. ―That such convergence exists is more widely in Europe is open to doubt and... 
opportunities for collaboration are generally wasted‖122. Subregional groupings can contribute to 
the success of cooperative efforts. States within a subregional group have the necessary platform 
to work together and to establish parallel defence strategies. Since countries are inclined to view 
potential threats to security through specific national lenses, significant variation undoubtedly 
exits. The characteristics which are unique to subregional groups might also help to facilitate 
inter-state defence cooperation. 
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5.3. The Authority of Subregionalism 
The Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia share similar historical memories, 
comparable size and a neighbouring geographic space. The three countries also share some key 
defence and security interests. Central Europe exists within an interconnected security complex 
and therefore states cannot isolate themselves from the security challenges of their neighbours. 
As stated in the theory section, geographical closeness and in particular, being closely bound by 
land, increases the interconnectedness of a set of states. Given the fact that these countries are 
generally small states and are physically conjoined on land, in system with larger powers, they 
are faced with the threat of marginalization. ―Much of the anxiety in small-state capitals with 
respect to the future of the security order in Europe can be traced to the fear of domination by the 
great powers; a fear that is motivated not only by the possible emergence of a balance of power 
system but also by the development of great power collusion and exclusivity‖123. 
All three small states have become NATO members in an effort to maintain their position 
in the international system. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia consider NATO as a key 
factor of the survival of the state. By being member state of the collective security organization 
of NATO, these small states guarantee their involvement in the decision making process of the 
organization. For security purposes, the Visegrad countries consider NATO to be a vital source 
of state security and the EU‘s ESDP as a complimentary asset to the efforts of NATO collective 
defence. An important factor in inter-state cooperation in the region has been the presence of the 
Visegrad subregional organization. Subregional cooperation in Central Europe has experienced 
different period of active cooperation and quiet latency. ―Since 2004 VG cooperation has been 
relatively stable. This has been in contrast to the somewhat more volatile EU preaccession phase 
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during which oscillation between relatively high- visibility/ resonance and virtual extinction fed 
perennial uncertainty about the value and viability of the VG‖124. In recent years the Visegrad 
organization has undergone a revival of political interest. Member states have taken part in 
regular meetings in an effort to increase dialogue between each other. Attempts have been made 
in the course of these meetings, and through other initiatives such as joint expert groups, to align 
certain aspects of foreign and defence policy.  
Subregionalism can be applied to the neorealist paradigm to explore a distinctive aspect 
of the current political atmosphere. Within the Visegrad subregional group, a variety of 
cooperation has transpired. One of the most tangible presences of interstate cooperation in the 
region is the International Visegrad Fund (IVF). The IVF is a good example of the cooperation 
of Visegrad countries through common cultural, scientific and educational projects, youth 
exchanges, cross-border projects and tourism promotion
125
. The IVF is presently the only formal 
institution within Visegrad.  
One of the most recent examples of cooperation amongst members has been the 2010 
―Visegrad Security Cooperation Initiative‖ project. This project, funded by the IVF, focused on 
bringing together specialists from all four countries to discuss emerging security threats to the 
region. Member countries examined ways in which they can develop a common voice on 
security issues. Classical defence issues were specifically mentioned as still relevant for security 
concerns in the area. The aim of such project was to resume the discourse on closer security 
cooperation between member states. 
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In recent years the Czech Republic and Slovakia have taken part in a joint Air Force 
program known as the Blue Border Air Force. According to reports from Czech Radio, the 34 
pilots and soldiers initiative, engaged in training in both the Czech Republic and Slovakia and 
was part of the Joint Sky project to mutually prepare military units from the two countries for 
potential threats and attack
126
. Another example is the joint efforts at the modernization of MiG 
airplanes between Poland, Slovakia, and until recently, Hungary. ―One interesting case for that is 
the MiG-29, which is operated by Poland and Slovakia (and was, until the end of 2010, by 
Hungary as well). Slovakia and Poland recently decided to pursue the life-extension and 
modernization of the MiG fleet, while Hungary -due to inadequate operation of aircraft in the 
past- no longer contemplates keeping the ―Fulcrum‖. I believe that many operational problems 
could have been avoided if stronger cooperation had existed among the air forces when it came 
to information exchange‖127. 
Visegrad subregional cooperation could increase the relative power of member countries 
as a whole. If Visegrad countries spoke with a single voice on certain shared policy interests, 
their efforts to address such concerns would be rendered more fruitful. Despite such continued 
efforts, somewhat modest results have been witnessed. ―The trend towards regionalism in Europe 
opens new avenues of foreign policy activity for small states. Although these forums cannot by 
and large satisfy the central security concerns of small states, local foreign policy activity has 
some advantages. Subregional frameworks can examine issues of shared importance that 
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institutions or organization with broader memberships are unable or unwilling to address, and 
such frameworks can assist in the management of immediate and pressing local problems‖128.  
According to Andrew Cottey, the prevalence of subregional groupings can only increase 
the soft security threats in non-military areas such as illegal immigration, organized crime and 
terrorism. According to the author, the countries of Central Europe are strategically unbalanced 
and are too diverse to be able to mitigate hard military security contributions
129
.  Cooperation 
within the organization of Visegrad faces some fundamental obstacles according to neorealism. 
According Mearsheimer‘s classifications of the different types of systems, the Visegrad 
cooperation would fall under the category of an unbalanced multipolar system because of the 
relatively great power and size of Poland in comparison to the other three small states. According 
to the author, such an unbalanced multipolar is most prone to conflict and therefore might find 
cooperation more difficult
130
.  
Neo realism postulates three reasons why an unbalanced multipolar system, such a 
Visegrad, would not encourage defence and security cooperation. The reasons for this are that 
there is more chance for power imbalance, there is more possibility for conflict and there is the 
likelihood of miscalculation in the intentions of the other members of the subregional group
131
.  
The key to Visegrad security cooperation therefore is based on a shared political will. Poland‘s 
relatively large size is expected to incite balancing behaviour by the other three states. Poland‘s 
position as a potential hegemonic power in Central Europe is perceived as a threat to the smaller 
countries in the organization.    
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Poland has also openly expressed its desires to become one of the ―Big Six‖ states in 
Europe. The country‘s national interest in this sense differs from the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Slovakia. ―Poland [is]... eager to play an active part in shaping major EU policies central to 
its own interest and ambitions, including the Common Agricultural Policy (of the European 
Union) (CAP) and Common Foreign Security Policy (European Union) (CFSP) and also to 
favour eastern borders being as open as possible taking a positive attitude towards cross-border 
movement of traders and workers‖132. The country‘s military agenda to play a more active role in 
operations outside of the European Union distinguishes it from its Visegrad neighbours who are 
regarded as having a more defence oriented position on military activity. According to 
neorealism, small states will be less likely to cooperate with a potential hegemonic power.  
Poland‘s ambitions to gain more relative power are characteristic of large power states in 
the neorealist paradigm. The country aims to influence policy decisions and also to play an active 
role in shaping the region. So while there is opportunity for potential Visegrad cooperation on a 
number of defence and security issues and while the ―necessary mechanisms for exploring and 
acting upon common ground exists‖, the organization is not primed to become ―an automatic 
platform for coordinating position and speaking with one voice on the EU stage‖133. Visegrad 
publications have suggests that Poland should become the natural leader of the Visegrad 
organization
134
. According to the publication it would be of undoubted advantage to the 
organization to cooperate on security and defence matters with Poland as the motivator and 
coordinator for initiatives. In neorealist terms, this would place Poland in a position of a potential 
hegemon. Therefore, such a development is unlikely to occur. The very nature of Polish 
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ambitions and unique national interests pose a threat to the other smaller Visegrad countries. The 
other states have different defence policy interests and would fear being pulled in to Polish 
ambitions for military action; again raising the concerns over entrapment. 
The subregional organization of Visegrad was never intended to serve the purpose of 
producing common policy. The group can provide a platform for cooperation on areas of mutual 
agreement but it is unlikely to facilitate streamlining of defence issues between countries with 
diverging national interests. ―Furthermore, the fact that these days the VG... is an organisation 
consisting of states who are also EU members is further evidence that it was never in any sense 
conceived of as a substitute body‖135. Common interests between Visegrad member states can be 
identified and, if the political will exists, pursued but the organization does not ―exist to produce 
common positions‖136.  
 Despite concerns over its effectiveness, Visegrad continues to be an important foundation 
for state cooperation in the region. According to a publication by the Visegrad Security 
Cooperation Initiative, Visegrad continues to be the primary tool for subregional cooperation 
between Central European states. ―All countries perceive the Group as an important factor... 
[and]a successful platform and pattern‖137. 
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6. Conclusion 
In conclusion, security of survival is the highest goal of all states. Only once survival is 
assured will states cooperate on other matters. The small Central European states of the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Slovakia face no immediate military threats but by the nature of the 
anarchic system, the potential for change leads to concerns over instability.  
So while some would argue that the current environment is one of peace and a lack of 
threat, the difficulty of appropriating the necessary level of security for survival leads to distrust 
between states. For small states in Central Europe, the benefits of cooperation clearly outweigh 
the costs. Certain defence cooperative efforts take place in this system despite the concerns over 
trust and instability.  
Empirical evidence points out that the small Central European states cooperation on some 
defence matters but policy makers, and scholars alike, point to the fact that a lot more can be 
done. The current situation is favourable for cooperation between states with similar national 
interests. The global financial crisis, the subsequent reduction of defence spending by all states 
and the influence of subregionalism all contribute to initiatives of cooperation despite the 
aforementioned concerns. As such, cooperation between states with similar demographical 
characteristic and countries which share physical space are more likely to also share similar 
national interests. Cooperation in Central Europe is therefore easier between the three small 
states, rather than between all four of the Visegrad countries. The reason for this is the 
hegemonic nature of Poland, as viewed by the smaller powers. Another reason for this is the 
unique ambitions of Poland due to its greater size.  
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The small Central European states will cooperate in defence matters as long as they do 
not view cooperation as jeopardizing their survival. Neorealism would argue that Poland‘s 
ambitions for power are due to the insatiable need to amass relative power to safeguard against 
the anarchy of the system. This desire of the state puts it in direct conflict with the unique desires 
of the three smaller states.  
Cooperation is more likely to occur in the region through pooling initiatives over defence 
rather than through capacity specialisation. The reason for this is because states need to maintain 
a sovereign and self-controlled military presence as a guarantee for their survival. Therefore the 
nature of neorealist state of anarchy holds true, but regional and subregional characteristics also 
play an influential role. In addition, situations where the threat of entrapment is low, the states 
are also more likely to cooperate. 
The discourse on this subject supports my conclusion. I suggest that exploring neorealism 
through the prism of subregionalism can bring a unique insight to the possibility of further 
defence cooperation in the small states of Central Europe. Continued research in this regard will 
bring more insight into the phenomenon. As such, neorealist paradigm still holds a powerful 
position of influence over the aspects of reality. Certain shortcomings of the theory, and 
aforementioned points of weaknesses, can be supplemented by exploring a range of subregional 
influences.  
As such, cooperation between small Central European states is likely to continue to be 
encouraged. Progress in this field of Visegrad cooperation has thus been slow. A more fruitful 
endeavour would require these small states to seek out cooperation with other small states in the 
region with which they share similar national interests. Visegrad will continue to exist as a 
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platform for dialogue between the member countries and is unlikely to disappear in the short-
term. In the long-term however, programs such as the EDA will grow in importance and 
influence. The likely success or failure of any cooperative initiative will continue to reply on the 
will of the member states to see their endeavours to fruition.  
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